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Nicolas WERTH, L’ivrogne et la marchande de fleurs. Autopsie d’un meurtre de masse,
1937-1938. Paris : Taillandier, 2009, 335 p.
1 This is an intelligent, humane and rich book, one from which even the specialist has
much to learn. Werth carefully gathered together the exceptional documents unearthed
after 1991 by Memorial researchers, to whom the book is properly dedicated, and ably
combined them with those published by scholars such as Khaustov1, as well as with what
he himself discovered and learnt over the years, to produce the best book we have today
on the Great Terror. 
2 Given the extraordinary quality of the documents in question, capable of altering our
perception and interpretation of the first half of the twentieth century, Werth rightly
quotes from them at length, and reports some of them in full, following the model set by
Oleg Khlevniuk2. From this point of view, the book is but the natural evolution, and the
fruit, of the formidable season which renewed our knowledge of Soviet history through
the publication of hundreds of valuable documentary collections (sborniki dokumentov),
whose treasures often still wait for their historians. 
3 Since the very first pages, devoted to the case of a drunkard, Werth focuses on the “little
people”targeted by mass operations, noting that the great Moscow show trials were also
“événements-écrans”(16).  Far from what has been believed for a long time, the Great
Terrorwas  in  fact:“d’abord  et  avant  tout  une  vaste  entreprise  d’ingénierie  et  de
‘purification’ sociale visant à éradiquer, par des opérations secrètes, décidées et planifiées
au  plus  haut  niveau  […],  tous  les  éléments  ‘socialement  nuisibles’  et  ‘ethniquement
suspects’”(17).  More  than  90%  of  the  1937-1938  victims  were  exterminated  locally
following the “kulak” line (the 00447 decree) or one of the many national ones (Polish,
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German,  Latvian,  Finnish,  etc.).  The  “high”  purge  followed  instead  its  own  course:
arrested leaders, approximately 50,000, were generally brought to Moscow where they
were judged by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, and executed after Stalin
and his minions had signed the lists with their names, as required by nomenklatura rules. 
4 Werth thus immediately raises the question of the relations between “purges des élites et
opérations de masse,” the title he gave to his first chapter, to which I shall return after
discussing chapters 2-4, which form the heart of the book.
5 Chapter 2, “Le processus de prise de décision: quotas, lignes et dépassement,” is excellent.
It  begins  with  the  Politburo directive  of  July 2,  1937,  which Ezhov circulated among
regional and republican NKVD leaders, requesting that they send to Moscow within five
days data on how many anti-Soviet elements they had in their files, divided into two
categories on the basis of the danger they posed. The extremely complex and important
question of the preventive filing of potential enemies in the USSR is thus raised. File-
keeping started soon after the revolution, and the institutions involved were many. The
political police and the Party control commission, as far as former oppositionists were
concerned, kept the most important ones, but local soviets, the militia (and especially,
after 1933, its passport offices), employment bureaus, etc., had their own. 
6 The 15 or so categories under surveillance in 1937 were similar to those of 1922 (see my
L’Urss  di  Lenin  e  Stalin,  Bologna,  2007,  180-81).The  special  colonists  deported  in  the
1930-1933 kulak operations were the most important new entry, followed by exiled people
of  every  kind,  byvshie,  former  leaders  of,  and  participants  in,  peasant  insurrections,
members  of  the  clergy  of  all  religions,  sektanty,  former  members  of  political  parties,
especially socialist ones, party oppositionists, all those sentenced on the basis of Article 58,
and recidivists, political immigrants and foreign citizens in general, Soviet citizens who
had lived abroad or  had or  maintained contacts  with foreign countries,  and those of
“untrustworthy”  national  descent  (Polish,  German,  Baltic,  Romanian,  Finnish  etc.),
especially if they worked in armament-related factories. We do not know how many people
these categories included, but the grand total was certainly well over one million. 
7 Data  started  to  flow  in on  July 8,  and  in  the  following  days  the  Politburo  adopted
resolutions detailing regional and republican quotas, and establishing the troika which
was to “judge” the arrested. On July 16 the NKVD convened in Moscow a crucial meeting
to prepare such an exceptionally importantoperation. Orders were top-secret, and only
approximately 200 Republican and regional Party and NKVD leaders saw their written
version. Subordinates, apparently including district leaders, acted on oral instructions, a
proof not only of their blind obedience, but also of their basic support for the decision to
cleanse “once and for all” the country of its enemies. Werth quotes an extraordinary
document of the second half of July, in which Mironov, head of Western Siberia’s NKVD,
thus addressed his subordinates, ordering them to set up district and area operational
groups, and to choose suitable places for executions and burials:
Jusqu’à ce qu’on ait  terminé cette opération,  sachez que celle-ci  est  absolument
secrète, un secret d’État. Quand je vous présenterai le Plan attribué à notre région,
les chiffres que vous entendrez, vous devrez les faire disparaître de votre tête. Ceux
qui ne parviendront pas à extirper ces chiffres de leur tête,  ils  devront se faire
violence, et les chasser d’une manière ou d’une autre, car la moindre mention de
ces chiffres vous conduirait sur-le-champ devant un tribunal militaire […]. (86)
8 Ezhov  signed  NKVD  decree  00447  on  July 30,  and  the  Politburo  approved  it  on  the
following day. Operations thus started at the beginning of August. In 10 days 100,000 had
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already been arrested, and by September 1, executions already passed the 30,000 mark. In
August, Moscow explained what kind of people had to be sentenced first: side by side with
former political militants and participants in peasant insurrections we find recidivists
and people without a stable residence or occupation, often the victims of the cruel social
uprooting caused by Stalin’s revolution from above. In any case, contrary to what we
thought on the basis of survivors’ memoirs, in most cases only a few weeks separated
arrest from sentence.
9 Werth convincingly reconstructs the combination of pressure from above and initiative
from below which in the following months led to successive extensions of decree 00447’s
deadline. In yet another extraordinary document, we see Maltsev, head of Tomsk NKVD,
spurring his men to force the rhythm, “because our Urals colleagues are well ahead of us”
(108). And we read single Politburo decisions, like that of October 10, 1937, which “gave”
the kulak operation yet  another 120,000 new victims.  All  in all,  the number of  those
sentenced to camps thus doubled, and executions were multiplied fivefold.
10 As Werth rightly remarks, following Jansen’s and Petrov’s Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s
Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895-1940 (Stanford, 2002), we do not know the limits of Ezhov’s
autonomy  in  assigning  extra  quotas.  According  to  documents,  the  Politburo  gave
permission for 184,750 new victims, and Ezhov personally for about 300,000. Yet we also
know that in those months, Ezhov spent hundreds of hours in Stalin’s office, and we have
no records of their conversations. In any case, Stalin carefully followed the operations
and  he  did  set  the  tone,  e.g.  with  his  famous  toast  on  the  revolution’s  twentieth
anniversary, when he drank to the extermination of all state enemies, including their
family and lineage (rod, 141).
11 On January 14, 1938, Stalin personally extended the 00447 operation indefinitely, and four
days later he gave detailed instructions on the “lines” which were to be followed in a note
to Ezhov which opens striking perspectives on his way of thinking and acting3:
La ligne SR (de gauche et de droite, prise ensemble) n’est toujours pas dévidée… Est-
ce  que  le  NKVD  a  bien  un  fichier  des  SR  (des  « ex »)  infiltrés  dans  l’armée ?
Je voudrais bien recevoir ce fichier et rapidement. Est-ce que le NKVD a un fichier
des ex-SR hors de l’armée (dans les administrations) ? Je l’attends pour dans deux-
trois semaines… Il faut agir plus rapidement et efficacement.(109)
12 A month later, Stalin accorded Ukraine the largest extra quota ever granted to a “region.”
Werth reports the text of Ezhov’s extraordinary speech to the Ukrainian NKVD leaders, in
which—after praising file-building as an “indispensable preparatory work”—he invited
them to use the extra 30,000 victims well: “les 30 000 c’est la crème […] En un mot, il faut
couper les têtes, écrémer, enlever la crème […] Vous allez leur porter un tel coup qu’ils ne
s’en relèveront jamais”(113), words almost identical to those Lenin uttered in 1922 when
he ordered to use the famine to hit the Orthodox Church.
13 Not  surprisingly,  in  such  a  climate  local  police  officials  vied  with  one  another  in
“unearthing” huge conspiracies, and the combination of Marxism’s semi-paranoid vision
of  history  as  the  product  of  class  struggle,  the  Bolsheviks’  own obsession  with  plot
theories, fed by the civil war, and Stalin’s personal folly reached its acme.
14 In April 1938, decree 00447 was extended one more time, but only to border regions and
what Werth rightly terms the “dump” (zones poubelles), where the regime had confined its
enemies,  and  which  thus  needed  extra  “cleansing.”  For  the  last  couple  of  months,
however, “national operations” had become the terror’s most important “line.” Back on
August 11, 1937, following yet another Politburo decision, Ezhov had signed decree 00485,
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directed against the “Polish military organization.” It called for the arrest of all kinds of
Polish residents and émigrés, including political ones, as well as of all the “most active
elements” living in the Polish districts of the USSR. Two months later, after receiving a
report on the mass arrests of both Polish citizens and Soviet citizens of Polish descent,
Stalin  mailed  the  NKVD chief  yet  another  stunning  note:  “Cam.  Iejov.  Voilà  qui  est
excellent! Continuez à creuser,  à nettoyer et à éradiquer toute cette saleté polonaise.
Liquidez-la complètement au nom des intérêts de l’URSS” (140). 
15 The “Polish” decree was soon followed by those affecting other national groups. As Werth
remarks, the major difference between them and decree 00447 was the lack of quotas,
which resulted in a huge raise in the number of first-category victims, i.e. of executions. 
16 Chapter 3, “La mise en œuvre des ‘Opérations de masse’”, is also excellent, even though
the harshness of the events it deals with makes at times for painful reading. Perpetrators
and  their  methods  are  starkly  portrayed.  Werth  notes  that,  contrary  to  the
Khrushchevian legend, most NKVD leaders had entered the political police during the
civil war, and as in the civil war, the mass of the approximately 25,000 civilian agents (less
than one third of what they had been in 1921) only completed primary education. Thus
the structure was that of 1918-1921, with a thin layer of old Bolsheviks commanding a
corps of violence-prone ignorant individuals of very low social extraction, among whom
there were not a few former common criminals. Again, as in the civil war, theirs was a
cruel world, where crude ideology and devotion and fear of leaders lived side by side with
alcoholism and mass stealing during searches and arrests.
17 The civil war’s legacy is also attested by data, such as those concerning the 10,000 people
executed by the Altai Gubcheka alone in 1920. The scale of those executions, subsequently
repeated in Crimea, Tambov, the Northern Caucasus, etc., shows that the political police
was a tool already honed for mass murder. As attested by the thousands of executions
which ended the Georgian 1924 insurrection in blood or the 5,000 carried out by the
Siberian GPU in 1930, this practice continued in following years. One is thus forced to
conclude that the impressive table compiled by colonel Pavlov in 1953, on Khrushchev’s
order, on the people shot by the political police in Stalin’s time—a table most historians
regularly refer to—is unreliable, with the possible exception of 1937-38 (see below).
18 Such numbers, and their multiplication after July 1937, raise once more the question of
the perpetrators’ mentality and self-justifications. At the beginning, the announcement
that the time of the final struggle against the revolutionary state’s enemies had arrived
may have even aroused some enthusiasm. Yet the documents show that the awareness
that masses of innocents were being exterminated, and the repression of political police
cadres, created not a few problems. Alcoholism exploded, and as a NKVD official wrote
soon before his own arrest in 1938: “J’ai travaillé comme tout le monde à l’extermination
des ennemis, mais jamais ne m’a quitté la pensée que je pouvais à tout moment être
désarmé,  arrêté  et  descendu  dans  une  cave”  (151) —  a  thought  that  was  also  on
Khrushchev’s mind.4
19 Werth also tries to analyze the ways in which contemporaries interpreted the events.
Unfortunately the NKVD reports he uses are not so rich, but the feeling that “1920 was
back”  (179)  must  have  been  shared  by  many.  Those  reports  could  have  been
supplemented by memoirs such as F. Beck’s and W. Godin’s (two pseudonyms),5 which
contains  an  interesting  review  of  how  arrested  people  tried  to  explain  what  was
happening.  In  general,  however, with  no  knowledge of  the  secret  decrees  it  was
impossible fully to understand. 
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20 The hypothesis that in the fall of 1937 mass operations went partially out of control—but
never  in  the  sense  that  Stalin  could  not  stop  them  at  will—is  convincing,  and  as
convincing is the explanation that Werth provides for it. Three local factors were at play,
namely the needs to inflate numbers, to produce group cases and unmask the inobasa (the
milieus that foreign powers could use). These needs were however fed by Moscow. As the
head of Sverdlovsk’s NKVD told his subordinates in September 1937, reporting orders
from above: “Je ne veux plus d’affaires individuelles et de ‘propagande antisoviétique,’ il
nous faut des affaires groupées, espionnage, diversion et terrorisme” (195).
21 In order to produce such results and the required numbers, especially after the original
fileshad been exploited, new methods were devised. In Sverdlovsk, NKVD officers were
divided, on the basis of their “talents” into two groups, the “intellectuals”, charged with
producing conspiracies and confessions, and the “breakers” (casseurs), who had to extract
the needed signatures.  Two models of confessions were put together,  one for leading
conspirators, and the other for their agents. The investigators filled them out, adding a
few details of their own choosing concerning the nature of the sabotage or the espionage
activities. Previous industrial or car accidents, technical mishaps, etc., were put to good
use. Yet,  Stalin’s advice was sought even in such cases,  as when Vyshinskii asked his
permission to prosecute several managers for “sabotaging” Leningrad’s trolleybuses, a
request Stalin found the time to answer in detail, indicating also which article had to be
used in the incrimination of people he had never heard of (211).
22 The pages that follow are terrible, but indispensable to understand the Great Terror’s
reality, and Werth’s choice to publish a few frightful documents is fully justified. We read
of people beheaded, strangled, or whose skulls were crushed with iron bars by drunken
sadists  who  boasted  to  be  leaders  because  they  were  capable  “de  couper  la  viande
humaine comme du radis.” 
23 Werth opens Chapter 4,  devoted to the victims,  with Roginskii’s  and Petrov’s critical
assessment  of  Petrov’s  numbers,  which  should  be  revised  upward  by  approximately
5-10%, a significant percentage, but inferior to that which should be applied, for instance,
to the 1930 or 1932 figures.  All  in all,  725-741,000 people were executed in less than
16 months, and another 150-200,000 died in camps (235): one adult citizen out of 200 was
therefore executed, and one out of 100 arrested.
24 Werth then asks crucial questions relating to the geography of repression, and to the
national and social belonging of the victims. Karelia, which was both a zone poubelle for
deported people,  and a  border  area  whose inhabitants  could be  suspected of  double
loyalty, had the largest percentage of arrested people (3% of its population). Then came
Siberia, another great zone poubelle, with 1.8%, followed by the Donbass, the German Volga
Republic, Turkmenistan, and regions like Krasnodar and Sverdlovsk (from 1.2% to 1.6%).
Belorussia, Leningrad, and Moscow were “average,” as was Ukraine, where accounts with
Ukrainians had been settled in 1932-1933, and where many of the 1937-1938 victims were
people  of  Polish  or  German  descent.  Some  were  shot  for  having  spread  “false
information”  about  a “presumed  famine.” In  other  regions  like  Tatarstan,  Iaroslav,
Ivanovo, Riazan, etc., “only” 0.5% of the population fell victim to the Great Terror.
25 Out  of  a  total  of  636,000 Poles  or  Soviet  citizens  of  Polish descent  118-123,000 were
arrested, and 80% of those were shot. A “Pole” thus had 20 times as many chances to be
repressed as a Russian. “Germans,” “Finns,” and “Letts” followed (quotation marks are
needed because these were generally Soviet citizens). Werth does not address the Jewish
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question, but other scholars have claimed that urban, modernized Jews, especially those
who had emigrated to large Russian cities, and later became a major target of Stalinist
repression, apparently were not particularly hit by the Great Terror, perhaps also because
they were not yet considered a “dangerous” nationality,6 but this hypothesis still expects
confirmation. 
26 As  Werth  persuasively  argues,  NKVD  statistics  on  the  victims’  social  origin  and
composition were heavily tampered with in order to prove that the “right” groups had
been  targeted.  Figures  concerning  workers  and  kolkhozniki were  thus  conveniently
reduced. Clerics of all religious denominations, and members of former socialist parties,
socialist-revolutionaries in particular, were the hardest-hit groups. In December 1937, in
a report to Stalin, Ezhov boasted that the Orthodox Church had been annihilated, and his
claim was  supported  by  the  liquidation  of  approximately  90% of  the  clergy.  Former
socialist militants suffered a similar fate. Among special settlers, i.e. former “kulaks,” the
percentage of arrested people in some regions reached 20% of the adult male population,
but  on average  it  was  around 10%,  nine  times  less  than among former  Mensheviks.
Recidivists instead were singled out (up to 70% of those arrested in 1937-1938 had been
sentenced  in  the  past,  many  of  them for  “common”  crimes),  as  were  employees  of
defense-related  factories  and  institutions,  people  who  had  every  imaginable  kind  of
relations with foreign countries, and members of the still remaining independent social
groups, such as charretiers and individual peasants. 
27 Werth, however, also underlines the role of circumstances, like those that determined the
arrest and execution of the old flower sellermentioned in the book’s title. 
28 Werth discusses the Great  Terror’s  causes,  and its  possible interpretations,  in the first
chapter,  devoted to  elite  purges  and mass  operations.  Though always  interesting,  and
marking progress in crucial areas,  this chapter is not as convincing as the others.  The
purges of the élites are presented as the result of the combined pressure of two main fault
lines within the Stalinist system, that between: “la logique stalinienne du ‘clan,’ despotique
et policière, fondée sur le principe de l’allégeance, et la logique administrative d’un État
industriel moderne”(27); and the other between Moscow and the periphery. But similar
tensions, and even more intense ones, marked other dictatorships, and yet did not produce
the  mass  torture  and  the  extermination  of  the  dictator’s  former  companions  and  of
hundreds of thousands of people in peace time. The Bolshevik mentality and Stalin’s mind
were thus crucial factors and the bloody traits assumed by personal relations within the
élite in the USSR cannot be explained without understanding the despot’s personality. It was
within  it  that  what  Burckhardt  called  “ugly  imperial  madness”  assumed  particularly
disturbing features, shown by letters such as the one Stalin sent Ezhov in October, 1937,
while Iakovlev, the Narkomzem of collectivization, was under interrogation:
Ce qui m’intéresse, ce n’est pas l’activité passée de Iakovlev et de son épouse, mais
leurs  activités  d’espionnage  cette  dernière  année, et  précisément  au  cours  des
derniers mois. Je voudrais bien savoir pourquoi ces deux salauds allaient chaque
année à l’étranger. Faites leur cracher tout ce qu’ils essaient de nous cacher. (43)
29 The discussion of the combination between the need to eliminate the slag left by the
building of socialism once that building was declared over in 1936, and that to prepare for
war by eliminating all possible fifth columns, in precipitating the decision to “cleanse”
the country, a combination already remarked by Bukharin in a famous letter to Stalin, is
more convincing. As convincing is the reconstruction of the chronology of the “high”
purge  after  the  summer  of  1936,  which  hit  first,  in  connection  with  Stakhanovism,
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industrial specialists and Ordzhonikidze’s NKTP, then regional and republican cliques,
and finally—after the 1937 March plenum—top leaders, up to army ones in June. At the
new  plenum,  held  that  very  month,  Ezhov  denounced  the  existence  of  13 major
conspiracies led by former oppositionists. Thirty top leaders were arrested during the
meeting,  and in the following weeks  most  regional  and republican élites  were again
purged, often after the celebration of local show trials. 
30 The reconstruction of the backgroundof both the high purge and mass operations is not
as satisfactory. As to the former, Werth rightly recalls Stalin’s ominous speech at the
Seventeenth Congress, yet crucial events such as the show trials of 1930-1931, the party
crisis of 1932-1933, or the Enukidze affair of 1935 are not discussed. In a book devoted to
mass  operations,  this  is  not  a  serious  problem.  However,  the  outline  of  the  mass
operations’ “prehistory” we are presented with is not fully adequate either. 
31 Quite rightly, after stating that Kirov’s murder did not mark the beginning of the Terror,
Werth lists the role of collectivization and dekulakization, the famine and the “cleansing”
of cities that followed the introduction of passports at the end of 1932, and the campaign
to cleanse western borders of potential enemies launched in March 1933. He also rightly
underlines  the  creation  of  the  already  mentioned  zones  poubelles,  and  calls  to  our
attention Stalin’s obsession with the new “socially harmful elements” he himself  had
created, denounced at the January, 1933 plenum as a major danger for the regime, and
exterminated in 1937-1938. 
32 Often, however, these events are merely mentioned, Stalin’s interpretations and analyses
are not discussed, the role of theory and ideology—as in the repeated resort to Marx’s
“primitive  accumulation”  scheme,  or  in  the  use  of  “collective  categories”  and  thus
collective responsibility in the interpretation and manipulation of reality—is not given its
due, and “precedents” like the extermination of besprizornye along railroad lines, which
probably gave Stalin a “taste” of what could be done, are not recalled. 
33 Above all, the civil war, though mentioned, is not adequately treated (not in terms of
space, but in terms of its role), and the 1920s are simply not there. Yet categories and
fileswere already in use, cities were “cleansed” of socially harmful elements, and during
the war scare of 1927, Stalin repeatedly asked the GPU to resort to mass arrest to destroy
espionage  networks  and “lay  the  foundations  for  the  complete  destruction  with  all
revolutionary means” of counter-revolutionary organizations,  in order “to strengthen
the rear.” He then also underlined the need to liquidate socially alien elements in the
countryside and ordered the dissolution of some Polish districts in Belorussia,  whose
untrustworthy inhabitants were to be exiled.7 The final chapter,  “Sortir de la Grande
Terreur,” clearly shows how strong Stalin’s grip was on the mass operations’  general
course, if not on their local ones. The Great Terror ended as abruptly as it had begun, with
a secret Politburo resolution of November 18, 1938 which criticized major defects and
deformations in the NKVD’s work, but praised what had been done “in order to liquidate
enemies and cleanse the country” (291). Soon afterwards, Ezhov resigned, after admitting
his mistakes in a pitiful letter in which he also defended his good intentions “before the
Party CC and comrade Stalin in particular”(303). He was replaced with Beria, who had
already been called to  Moscow in  August  to  take  the place  of  Ezhov’s  arrested first
deputy. In spite of his chekist past, Beria, whose talents Stalin had appreciated since at
least  1932,  was  then  the  head  of  the  Georgian  party.  His  involvement  in  the  mass
operations  thus  mainly  consisted  in  organizing  their  winding  down,  sanctioned in  a
decree he signed on November 26. Ezhov himself was arrested in April and accused to be
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an agent of four different foreign powers, to have plotted to kill Stalin, Molotov and Beria
and of sodomy. Contrary to other important leaders, including Iagoda, his predecessor, he
did not even get the “honor” of a show trial (Stalin considered him a depraved nullity)
and was  executed at  the  beginning of  1940.  Apparently,  his  last  words  were  for  his
master: “Dites à Staline que je meurs avec Son nom sur mes lèvres” (311).
34 According to Werth,  Stalin stopped the Great  Terror because he realized that  it  was
pushing the country toward collapse and disorder, attested among other things by the
successful escapes of important NKVD leaders, such as Liushkov and Orlov, and because
he was aware that war was fast approaching, and stability was thus needed. These must
have indeed been important considerations, yet the Terror was perhaps stopped because,
and after, it had achieved its aims. 
35 Werth gave us a very important book, one which considerably furthers our knowledge of
a most important historical event. The documents he uses, and the interpretations he can
thus soundly put forward, confirm, and deepen, Khlevniuk’s and Petrov’s and Jansen’s
work. As all important books do, his too raises new problems and opens new lines of
investigations, regarding for example the role of ideology, mentalities and personality in
the Great Terror. And it leaves us pondering over the judgment we passed over an entire
historical period. In the light of what Werth tells us, the comparison of the ferocious new
European  states  acquires  yet  new  dimensions,  especially  as  far  as  the  1930s  are
concerned.
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